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Abstract
This paper presents a consensus protocol resilient to Byzantine failures. It uses signed and certified
messages and is based on two underlying failure detection modules. The first is a muteness failure
detection module of the class ✸M. The second is a reliable Byzantine behaviour detection mod-
ule. More precisely, the first module detects processes that stop sending messages, while processes
experiencing other non-correct behaviours (i.e., Byzantine) are detected by the second module. The
protocol is resilient to F faulty processes, F min((n− 1)/2,C) (where C is the maximum num-
ber of faulty processes that can be tolerated by the underlying certification service).
The approach used to design the protocol is new. While usual Byzantine consensus protocols are
based on failure detectors to detect processes that stop communicating, none of them use a module
to detect their Byzantine behaviour (this detection is not isolated from the protocol and makes it
difficult to understand and prove correct). In addition to this modular approach and to a consensus
protocol for Byzantine systems, the paper presents a finite state automaton-based implementation of
the Byzantine behaviour detection module. Finally, the modular approach followed in this paper can
be used to solve other problems in asynchronous systems experiencing Byzantine failures.
 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Consensus is a fundamental paradigm for fault-tolerant asynchronous distributed sys-
tems. Each process proposes a value to the others. All correct processes have to agree
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(Termination) on the same value (Agreement) which must be one of the initially proposed
values (Validity). Solving consensus in asynchronous distributed systems where processes
can crash is a well-known difficult task: Fischer, Lynch and Paterson have proved an im-
possibility result [7] stating that there is no deterministic solution to the consensus problem
in the presence of even a single crash failure. A way to circumvent this impossibility result
is to use the concept of unreliable failure detectors introduced by Chandra and Toueg [2].
A failure detector is composed of failure detection modules, one by process, that provides
it with a list of processes currently suspected by the detector to have crashed. A failure de-
tection module can make mistakes by not suspecting a crashed process or by erroneously
suspecting a correct one. Formally, a failure detector is defined by two properties: com-
pleteness (a property on the actual detection of process crashes), and accuracy (a property
that restricts the mistakes on erroneous suspicions). Among those classes, [3] proves that
the weakest one denoted ✸S allows to solve the consensus problem in a crash failure
model is based on strong completeness (eventually every crashed process is detected by
every correct process) and eventual weak accuracy (eventually, some correct process is not
suspected by any correct process).
Solving consensus in an environment where processes can exhibit a Byzantine behav-
iour (i.e., arbitrarily deviate from their program specification) is notably difficult. First
steps in this direction have been carried out by Malkhi and Reiter [10], Kihlstrom et al. [9]
and Doudou and Schiper [5].
Malkhi and Reiter [10] have been the first to propose an extension of failure detectors
able to cope with other types of failures. They have introduced a failure detector class✸S(bz) based on the notion of a quiet process. A process p is quiet if there exists a time
after which some correct process does not receive anymore messages from p. (Note that a
crashed process is a quiet process, but the converse is not true.) Failure detectors of class✸S(bz) satisfy strong completeness and eventual weak accuracy. Here, strong complete-
ness means that each correct process eventually suspects each quiet process, and eventual
weak accuracy has the same meaning as in the crash model [2].
More recently, Doudou et al. [6] have pointed out that, in presence of arbitrary failures,
it is no longer possible to define failure detectors independently of the protocols that rely on
them: unlike process crashes, other types of failures are not context-free. To cope with this,
the authors have introduced the notion of muteness: a process p is mute to a process q with
respect to a given protocolA if there is a time after which p stops to send to q messages it
should send according to A. Note that a process can be mute to some process with respect
to a given protocol, without being quiet (in fact, a mute process can continue to send mes-
sages that are not part of A). Consequently, these authors have introduced the notion of
muteness failure detector, and particularly the class ✸MA, where A denotes a particular
protocol. This class satisfies Strong Completeness (with respect to mute processes) and
Eventual Weak Accuracy. It can be seen as an instantiation of a generic class of omission
failure detectors, introduced by Dolev et al. [4]. Moreover, the specification of their mute-
ness failure detector makes sense only in the context of regular round-based distributed
algorithms (a precise definition of this class of algorithms is provided in [6]).
Kihlstrom et al. [9] noticed that messages need to be certified as well as signed. The sig-
nature allows a receiver to verify the sender while the certificate is a well-defined amount
of redundant information carried by messages that allows a receiver to check if the content
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of a message is valid and if the sending of the message was done “at the right time”. In
other words, a certificate allows a receiver to “look into the sender process” in order to see
if the actions that produced the sending were correct.
Both previous solutions [9,10] solve Strong Consensus, defined by the traditional agree-
ment and termination properties, but with another validity property, named Strong Validity.
It stipulates that, if all correct processes propose the same input value v, then a correct
process that decides must decide on that value. Strong Consensus has a major drawback:
when correct processes propose different values, they are allowed to decide on a value
that is not necessarily connected to their inputs. More generally, the traditional validity
property is not adequate to define the consensus problem in a Byzantine setting. A Byzan-
tine process can initially propose an irrelevant value (i.e., a value different from the one it
should propose) and then behave correctly. There is no way for the other processes to detect
this failure. Consequently, the set of correct processes could agree on an irrelevant value v
proposed by a process. A significant advance has been done by Doudou and Schiper [5] to
circumvent this drawback: they have introduced a new validity property, namely the Vec-
tor Validity property. In this case, each process proposes a vector which contains a certain
number (at least one) of correct entries. An entry is correct if it is from a correct process.
So, processes have first to construct these vectors. Then, processes agree on one of these
vectors. This problem is called Vector Consensus. They have also shown that Vector Con-
sensus does not suffer from the same drawback as Strong Consensus, in the sense that other
agreement problems (e.g., Atomic Broadcast) can be reduced to Vector Consensus.
In the same papers [5,6] these authors have proposed a protocol that solves Vector Con-
sensus. Let F be the maximal number of processes that may be faulty (with F < n where n
is the total number of processes). Assuming F = (n−1)/3, this protocol satisfies Agree-
ment, Termination and Vector Validity where at least F + 1 entries of the decided vector
are from correct processes. It is built as an extension of a consensus protocol designed
for the crash failure model [12]. To cope with other Byzantine failures, it uses a muteness
failure detector of class ✸M and properly signed and certified messages. The muteness
failure detector detects only mute processes, and the detection of other Byzantine failures
is imbricated into the protocol itself.
In this paper, we propose a protocol to solve Vector Consensus in a Byzantine asynchro-
nous distributed system. As in [6], this protocol is based on a muteness failure detector of
the class ✸M. However, the detection of other Byzantine failures is not imbricated in the
protocol, but is carried out by a Byzantine behaviour detector. The proposed implementa-
tion of such a detector uses signed and certified messages. Whereas all the aforementioned
protocols [2,5,9] require F = (n− 1)/3,1 ours assumes F min((n− 1)/2,C) where
C is the maximum number of faulty processes the underlying certification service used
by the protocol can cope with.2 This is due to our approach that clearly separates the con-
1 In an asynchronous distributed system prone to process crash failures and equipped with a failure detector
of the class ✸W , the consensus problem requires F  (n− 1)/2 to be solved [2]. In synchronous systems with
Byzantine process failures, the Byzantine general problem requires F  (n− 1)/3 if messages are not signed
(“oral messages”), and F  (n− 1) if messages are signed [11].
2 Previously used certification mechanisms require C = (n− 1)/3 [2,5,9]. This explains why these works
consider F = (n− 1)/3 in their consensus protocols and in their proofs.
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straints due to the underlying certification service from the constraints due to the consensus
protocol that uses this service. The protocol uses as a skeleton an efficient consensus pro-
tocol designed by Hurfin and Raynal [8] for the crash failure model, and extends it to cope
with the other Byzantine failures. The resulting protocol satisfies Agreement, Termination
and Vector Validity with at least α = n − 2F entries from correct processes (note that,
due to definition of F , we have α  1. So, the proposed protocol allows to solve other
agreement problems, such as Atomic Broadcast [5]).
The muteness failure detector of class ✸M, and the Byzantine behaviour detector are
composed of detection modules, one for each process. So, each process is actually com-
posed of five modules: (i) a consensus module, (ii) a muteness failure detection module,
(iii) a Byzantine behaviour detection module, (iv) a certification module and (v) a signa-
ture module. The consensus module executes the protocol. The muteness failure detection
module and the Byzantine behaviour detection module are used to reveal mute processes,
and processes with other Byzantine behaviours, respectively. If the process is Byzantine,
these three modules can behave in a Byzantine way. The other two modules do not behave
maliciously. The signature module filters out messages in which the sender must be iden-
tified. The certification module manages certificates to be associated with messages. Note
that the previous Byzantine consensus protocols leave to the protocol itself the detection
of faulty processes not captured by the (unreliable) muteness failure detector. The intro-
duction of a Byzantine behaviour detector, separated from the consensus protocol, is a new
approach that provides a general, efficient, modular and simple way to extend distributed
protocols to cope with Byzantine failures. In that sense, the contribution of this paper is not
only algorithmic and practical (with the design of a new Byzantine consensus protocol),
but also methodological.3
Moreover, an implementation of the Byzantine behaviour detection modules is de-
scribed. This implementation is based on a set of finite state automata, one for each process.
At the operational level, the module associated with a process pi intercepts all messages
sent to pi from the underlying network and checks if their sendings are done according
to the program specification. In the affirmative, it relays the message to pi ’s consen-
sus module. The Byzantine behaviour detection module maintains a set (Byzantinei ) of
processes it detected to experience at least one Byzantine behaviour. Differently from the
muteness failure detector of class ✸M, the Byzantine behaviour detector is reliable (i.e.,
Byzantine behaviour detection modules associated with correct processes do not make
mistake).
The paper is made of seven sections. Section 2 addresses the consensus problem in
a crash failure model. Section 3 presents the Byzantine asynchronous distributed system
model. Then Section 4 presents the Byzantine consensus protocol. Section 5 provides a
finite state automaton-based implementation of the Byzantine behaviour detection module.
Section 6 presents the proof of correctness of the protocol shown in Section 4. Finally,
Section 7 concludes the paper.
3 A more general methodological approach has been presented by the authors in [1].
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2. Consensus in the crash failure modelThis section considers the consensus problem in a distributed asynchronous system
where processes can fail by crashing (i.e., a process behaves correctly until it possibly
crashes). So, in this section, a correct process is a process that does not crash. Failure de-
tectors suited to this model [2] and a consensus protocol [8] based on such failure detectors
are presented.
2.1. Asynchronous systems
We consider a system consisting of n > 1 processesΠ = {p1,p2, . . . , pn}. Each process
executes a sequence of statements defined by its program text. Any pair of processes com-
municate by exchanging messages through reliable4 and FIFO5 channels. As the system is
asynchronous, there is no assumption about the relative speed of processes or the message
transfer delays.
2.2. Consensus
Every correct process pi proposes a value vi and all correct processes have to decide
on some value v, in relation to the set of proposed values. More precisely, the Consensus
problem is defined by the three following properties [2,7]:
Termination: Every correct process eventually decides on some value.
Validity: If a process decides v, then v was the initial value proposed by some process.
Agreement: No two correct processes decide differently.
2.3. Failure detectors
Informally, a failure detector consists of a set of modules, each one attached to a process:
the module attached to pi maintains a set (named suspectedi ) of processes it currently
suspects to have crashed. Any failure detection module is inherently unreliable: it can make
mistakes by not suspecting a crashed process or by erroneously suspecting a correct one.
As in [2], we say “process pi suspects process pj ” at some time t , if at time t we have
pj ∈ suspectedi .
Failure detector classes have been defined by Chandra and Toueg [2] in terms of two
properties, namely Completeness and Accuracy. They showed that the weakest failure de-
tectors to solve consensus is ✸S which is based on the following properties:
Strong Completeness: Eventually, every crashed process is permanently suspected by
every correct process.
Eventual Weak Accuracy: Eventually, some correct process is never suspected by any cor-
rect process.
4 I.e., a message sent by a process pi to a process pj is eventually received by pj , if pj is correct.
5 This assumption simplifies the solution when addressing Byzantine failures.
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Several protocols solving consensus have been proposed using failure detectors of
class ✸S . These protocols, in the setting proposed in this section, require the majority
of processes to be correct (i.e., F < n/2, where F is the maximum number of faulty
processes).
2.4. Hurfin–Raynal’s Consensus protocol
This section provides a brief description of a version of Hurfin–Raynal’s protocol [8]
that assumes FIFO channels (this constraint is not required by the original protocol). As
other consensus protocols, this one proceeds in successive asynchronous rounds and uses
the rotating coordinator paradigm. During a round, a predetermined process (the round
coordinator) tries to impose a value as the decision value. To attain this goal, each process
votes: either (vote CURRENT) in favor of the value proposed by the round coordinator
(when it has received one), or (vote NEXT) to proceed to the next round and benefit from
a new coordinator (when it suspects the current coordinator). Agreement is obtained by a
majority principle: a value gets locked as soon as, during a round it has been forwarded by a
majority of processes. Moreover, when a value is locked, it will be the decision value. The
protocol ensures that all correct processes become aware of this decision value because,
once a value v has been locked during a round r , then any process entering a round r ′ > r
has v as estimate value.
From an operational point of view, with each process pi is associated a finite state
automaton, whose role is to manage the behaviour of pi with respect to its vote during the
current round. Each of these automata has three states. Let statei denote the current state
of the automaton associated with pi . During a round, the signification of these three states
is the following:
• statei = q0: pi has not yet voted (q0 is the automaton initial state).
• statei = q1: pi has voted CURRENT and has not changed its mind (pi moves from q0
to q1).
• statei = q2: pi has voted NEXT.
Using such an automaton to describe the protocol is important, since the adaptation to
the Byzantine failure model, and particularly the implementation of the Byzantine behav-
iour detection module, will be based on a similar automaton.
Local variables. In addition to the local variable statei , process pi manages the follow-
ing four local variables:
• ri defines the current round number.
• esti contains the current estimation by pi of the decision value.
• nb_currenti (respectively nb_nexti ) counts the number of CURRENT (respectively
NEXT) votes received by pi during the current round.
• rec_fromi is a set composed of the process identities from which pi has received a
(CURRENT or NEXT) vote during the current round.
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Finally, suspectedi is a set managed by the associated failure detection module (cf.
Section 2.3); pi can only read this set.
Automaton transitions. The protocol manages the progression of each process pi within
its automaton, according to the following rules. At the beginning of round r , statei = q0.
Then, during r , the transitions are:
• Transition q0 → q1 (pi first votes CURRENT). This transition occurs when pi , while
in the initial state q0, receives a CURRENT vote (line 8). This means that pi has not
previously suspected the round coordinator (line 13). Moreover, when pi moves to q1
and it is not the current coordinator, it broadcasts a CURRENT vote (line 11).
• Transition q0 → q2 (pi first votes NEXT). This transition occurs when pi , while in the
initial state q0, suspects the current coordinator (line 13). This means that pi has not
previously received a CURRENT vote. Moreover, when pi moves to q2, it broadcasts a
NEXT vote (line 14).
• Transition q1 → q2 (pi changes its mind). This transition (executed by statements at
line 18) is used to prevent a possible deadlock. A process pi that has issued a CURRENT
vote is allowed to change its mind if pi has received a (CURRENT or NEXT) vote from
a majority of processes (i.e., |rec_fromi | > n/2) but has received neither a majority
of CURRENT votes (so it cannot decide), nor a majority of NEXT votes (so it cannot
progress to the next round). Then pi changes its mind in order to make the protocol
progress: it broadcasts a NEXT vote to favor the transition to the next round (line 18).
Protocol description. Function consensus() consists of two concurrent tasks. The first
task handles the receipt of a DECIDE message (lines 2–3); it ensures that if a correct process
pi decides (line 3 or line 12), then all correct processes will also receive a DECIDE message.
The second task (lines 4–21) describes a round: it consists of a loop that constitutes the core
of the protocol. Each (CURRENT or NEXT) vote is labeled with its round number.6
• At the beginning of a round r , the current coordinator pc proposes its estimate vc
to become the decision value by broadcasting a CURRENT vote carrying this value
(line 6).
• Each time a process pi receives a (CURRENT or NEXT) vote, it updates the correspond-
ing counter and the set rec_fromi (lines 9 and 16).
• When a process receives a CURRENT vote for the first time, namely, CURRENT
(pk, r, estk), it adopts estk as its current estimate esti (line 10). If, in addition, it is
in state q0, it moves to state q1 (line 11).
• A process pi decides on an estimate proposed by the current coordinator as soon as
it has received a majority of CURRENT votes, i.e., a majority of votes that agree to
conclude during the current round (line 12).
6 In any round ri , only votes related to round ri can be received. A vote from pk related to a past round is
discarded and a vote related to a future round rk (with rk > ri ) is buffered and delivered when ri = rk .
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• When a process progresses from round r to round r + 1 it issues a NEXT (line 20) if it
did not do it in the while loop. These NEXT votes are used to prevent other processes
from remaining blocked in round r (line 7).
3. Consensus in a Byzantine model
This section first defines what is meant by “Byzantine” behaviour. Then it defines a ver-
sion of the consensus problem suited to the Byzantine system model. Finally the modules
that are part of the system model are described.
3.1. Byzantine processes
A correct process is a process that does not exhibit a Byzantine behaviour. A process is
Byzantine if, during its execution, one of the following faults occurs:
Crash The process stops executing statements of its program and halts.
Corruption The process changes arbitrarily the value of a local variable (i.e., arbitrary
assignment) with respect to its program specification. This fault could be propa-
gated to other processes by including incorrect values in the content of a message
sent by the process.
Omission The process omits to execute a statement of its program (e.g., it omits to send
a message, it omits to update a variable, etc.). If a process omits to execute an
assignment, this could lead to a corruption fault.
Duplication The process executes more than one time a statement of its program. Note
that if a process executes an assignment more than one time, this could lead to a
corruption fault.
Misevaluation The process misevaluates an expression included in its program. This fault
is different from a corruption fault: misevaluating an expression does not imply
the update of the variables involved in the expression and, in some cases (e.g.,
conditions used in if and loop statements) the result of an evaluation is not as-
signed to a variable.
Distinction between misevaluation and corruption is extremely important, particularly
in the case of conditions. Conditions involving local variables can be misleading because
of a corruption fault, even though no misevaluation occurred. For example, in a test like if
(statei = q0) (line 14 of Fig. 1), the value statei could have been previously corrupted.
But failures experienced by a Byzantine process cannot be revealed to other processes
(and have no consequence on their behaviour) unless the Byzantine process send messages.
Thus, the important point is the effect of Byzantine failures and the consequence they can
have on the safety and liveness properties of the computation. These effects are of three
types:
• Message corruption, i.e., inclusion of corrupted value in a message.
• Message sending omission, i.e., omission to send a message at the right time.
• Message sending duplication.
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function consensus(vi )
(1) ri ← 0; esti ← vi ;
cobegin
(2) || upon receipt of DECIDE(pk, estk )
(3) send DECIDE(pi, estk) to Π ; return(estk)
(4) || loop % on a sequence of asynchronous rounds %
(5) c← (ri mod n)+ 1; ri ← ri + 1; statei ← q0; rec_fromi ←∅;
nb_nexti ← 0; nb_currenti ← 0;
(6) if (i = c) then send CURRENT(pi, ri , esti ) to Π ; statei ← q1 endif;
(7) while (nb_nexti  n/2) do % wait until a branch can be selected, and then execute it %
(8) upon receipt of CURRENT(pk, ri , estk )
(9) nb_currenti ← nb_currenti + 1; rec_fromi ← rec_fromi ∪ {pk};
(10) if (nb_currenti = 1) then esti ← estk endif;
(11) if (statei = q0) then send CURRENT(pi, ri , esti ) to Π ; statei ← q1 endif;
(12) if (nb_currenti > n/2) then send DECIDE(pi, esti ) to Π ; return(esti ) endif
(13) upon (pc ∈ suspectedi )
(14) if (statei = q0) then statei ← q2; send NEXT(pi, ri ) to Π endif
(15) upon receipt of NEXT(pk, ri )
(16) nb_nexti ← nb_nexti + 1; rec_fromi ← rec_fromi ∪ {pk}
(17) upon ((statei = q1) ∧ (|rec_fromi |> n/2))
(18) statei ← q2; send NEXT(pi, ri ) to Π
(19) endwhile
(20) if (statei = q2) then statei ← q2; send NEXT(pi, ri ) to Π endif
(21) endloop
coend
Fig. 1. Hurfin–Raynal’s ✸S-based Consensus protocol (adapted to FIFO channels).
The role of a Byzantine behaviour detector will be to detect these effects.
3.2. From Consensus to Vector Consensus
Doudou and Schiper have pointed out [5] that in the presence of Byzantine processes the
validity property of consensus described in Section 2.2 is not adequate. Hence, they have
defined the Vector Consensus problem by using the Agreement and Termination property
of Section 2.2 and the following Vector Validity property [5]:
Vector Validity. Every process decides on a vector vect of size n (let vi denote the value
proposed by pi ):
• For every process pi : if pi is correct, then either vect[i] = vi or vect[i] = null, and
• At least α  1 elements of vect are initial values of correct processes.7
7 [5] considers the case α = F + 1.
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So, to solve Vector Consensus, there is a preliminary phase where each process has
to build its initial vector, containing at least α initial values of correct processes. Then,
processes have to solve the classical consensus problem where each one proposes the vec-
tor built in the preliminary phase.
3.3. The class ✸MA of failure detectors
Let us consider the concept of mute process introduced by Doudou et al. in [6].
A process pi is mute if there exists a time t after which a correct process stops receiving
messages from pi with respect to a particular protocol A, i.e., pi stops sending messages
it is supposed to send according to its protocol structure. This includes, but is not limited
to, the process crash, where the process stops executing statements of its program and
halts.
Considering a mute process as a faulty process, the Completeness property of Sec-
tion 2.3 is redefined as follows [5]:
Strong Completeness: Eventually, every mute process is permanently suspected by every
correct process.
A failure detector that satisfies Eventual Weak Accuracy and the definition of Strong
Completeness based on the notion of mute process belongs to the ✸M class. It is interest-
ing to remark that the mute notion captures only some Byzantine behaviours (permanent
message omissions). All the other Byzantine behaviours are captured by the Byzantine be-
haviour detector that will be introduced in the next section. Finally, the specification of a
muteness failure detector makes sense only in the context of regular round-based distrib-
uted algorithms (a precise definition of this class of algorithms is provided in [6]).
3.4. Additional assumptions on the model
We denote by F the maximum number of Byzantine processes. F is a known bound, and
we assume F min((n−1)/2,C) (whereC is the maximum number of faulty processes
allowed by the certification mechanism). So, at least n− F  max((n + 1)/2, n− C)
processes are correct.
Key cryptosystem. Each process pi possesses a private key and a public key. The private
key is used by pi to sign, in an unforgeable way, outgoing messages. A message m signed
by pi is denoted 〈m〉i . Upon the arrival of a signed message at pi , the sender’s public key
allows the receiver pi to verify the identity of the assumed message sender.
Certificates. Messages exchanged during the execution of a protocol must be consis-
tent with the protocol specification, i.e., they have to be sent at the right time and have
to carry the correct values. The usage of a key cryptosystem is not sufficient to achieve
this goal. That is why another tool, called certification, must be used. With each mes-
sage of the protocol is attached a certificate. A certificate is a well-defined amount of
redundant information, including a part of the message sender’s history. Let us denote
by m.cert the certificate attached to a message m. We will say that m.cert is well-formed
with respect to a value v contained in m if the value of v can be checked by the certifi-
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cate (i.e., by matching v against the information constituting m.cert). Similarly, we will
say that m.cert is well-formed if the decision to send m can be checked by the certifi-
cate.
A correct certification service must satisfy the following properties. For each message
m of the protocol:
• Accuracy: if the information included in m.cert is corrupted, then the sender is detected
as faulty by a correct receiver,
• Consistency: m.cert is properly formed and well-formed with respect to all values
contained in m.
Technically, a correct certification service can be implemented in the following way. Each
certificate is a set of signed messages. Accuracy results from the fact that no process can
falsify the content of a signed message without being detected as faulty by a correct re-
ceiver. Consistency is achieved by selecting appropriate signed messages among those
whose receipt is the cause of the sending of m, or whose content has influenced the values
included in m. Then, “majority” arguments are used: proper and well-formed certificates
are required to contain at least n− C messages, sufficient to “witness” the content of the
message and the occurrence of events enabling the sending of the message (recall that as
we assume F  min(n−12 ,C), at least n − F  n − C processes are correct). Known
certification techniques assume n−C =  2n+13 .
We denote as 〈m,m.cert〉i a certified and signed message m sent by pi . 〈m,m.cert〉i is
properly formed if its certificate is properly formed.
3.5. Structure of a process
A process consists of five modules whose role has been presented in the introduction:
(i) a consensus module, (ii) a Byzantine behaviour detection module, (iii) a muteness
failure detection module, (iv) a certification module, and (v) a signature module. More
precisely, the structure of a process pi is given in Fig. 2. The same figure also shows the
path followed by a message m (respectively m′) received (respectively sent) by pi .
Signature module. Each message arriving at pi is first processed by this module which
verifies the signature of the sender (by using its public key). If the signature of the message
is inconsistent with the identity field contained in the message, the message is discarded
Fig. 2. Structure of a process pi .
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and its sender identity (known thanks to the unforgeable signature), is passed to the Byzan-
tine behaviour detection module to be added to the set Byzantinei . Otherwise, the message
is passed to the muteness failure detection module. Also, each message sent by pi is
signed by the signature module just before leaving the process. So, if the sender iden-
tity contained in the message is corrupted, this will be discovered by the receiver signature
module.
Muteness detection module. This module manages the set suspectedi . It is devoted to the
detection of mute processes [5]. The set of modules constitute a muteness failure detector
of class ✸M. It can be implemented by a set of time-outs. Upon the receipt of a message
sent by process pk , the signature module of pi resets the local timer associated with pk
and, if pk ∈ suspectedi , removes pk from that set. Then, the message is passed to pi ’s
Byzantine behaviour detection module. When the timer associated with pk expires, pk is
appended to suspectedi . It is important to note that, due to asynchrony, the implementation
of the Eventual Weak Accuracy property of ✸M can at best be approximate.
Byzantine behaviour detection module. This module receives messages from the mute-
ness detection module and checks if they are properly formed and follow the program
specification of the sender. In the affirmative, it passes the message to pi ’s certifica-
tion module. The Byzantine behaviour detection module maintains a set (Byzantinei ) of
processes it detected to experience at least one Byzantine behaviour such as duplication,
corruption or misevaluation. We say “process pi declares pj to be Byzantine” at some time,
if, at that time, pj ∈ Byzantinei . Note that differently from the muteness failure detection
module, the Byzantine behaviour detection module associated with a correct process pi is
reliable (i.e., if pj ∈ Byzantinei , then pj has experienced an incorrect behaviour detected
by the Byzantine behaviour detection module of pi ). Finally, as for the set suspectedi ,
pi ’s consensus module can only read Byzantinei . Let us note that Byzantinei cannot be
corrupted by process pi ’s consensus module, but, this does not prevent pi ’s consensus
module to misevaluate an expression involving Byzantinei (e.g., pj ∈ Byzantinei is evalu-
ated to false by pi even though it was actually true).
Section 5 is devoted to the implementation of the Byzantine behaviour detection mod-
ule.
Certification module. This module is responsible, upon the receipt of a message from
the Byzantine behaviour detection module, for updating the corresponding certificate local
variable. It is also in charge to append properly formed certificates to the messages that are
sent by pi .
4. The Vector Consensus protocol
Each of the previously proposed protocols solving consensus in Byzantine systems is
based on a skeleton protocol solving consensus in a process crash model. [2] and [9] use
[2], and [5] uses [12]. We have chosen Hurfin–Raynal’s protocol [8] as a skeleton for
our Byzantine consensus protocol because, in addition to its conceptual simplicity, this
protocol is particularly efficient when the underlying failure detector makes no mistakes,
whether there are failures or not.
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4.1. Local variablesEach local variable is a way that a Byzantine process can use to attack correct processes
by corrupting its value. Hence, local variables should be used very rarely and their values
should be carefully certified.
• nb_currenti (respectively nb_nexti ) can be replaced by using the cardinality of the cer-
tificate current_certi (respectively next_certi ) which contains properly formed CUR-
RENT (respectively NEXT) votes received in the current round.
• statei can assume three values (q0, q1, q2). Each state can be identified (when neces-
sary) by using certificates in the following way:
– statei = q0: no CURRENT vote has been received by pi and pi has not sent a NEXT
vote. I.e., (|current_certi | = 0)∧ 〈next(pi, ri ), cert〉i /∈ next_certi .
– statei = q1: a CURRENT vote has been received by pi and pi has not sent a NEXT
vote: (|current_certi | 1)∧ 〈next(pi, ri ), cert〉i /∈ next_certi .
– statei = q2: pi has sent a NEXT vote: 〈next(pi, ri ), cert〉i ∈ next_certi .
• rec_fromi can be replaced by the variable REC_FROMi using certificates in the fol-
lowing way:
REC_FROMi ≡
{
p|〈next(p, r), cert〉 ∈ next_certi ∨
〈current(p, est_vect, r), cert〉 ∈ current_certi
}
.
The predicate change_mind. For the sake of brevity, let change_mind denote the fol-
lowing predicate:
(|current_certi | 1
)∧ 〈next(pi, ri ), cert
〉
i
/∈ next_certi ∧ |REC_FROMi | (n− F).
This predicate corresponds to the predicate (statei = q1)∧ (|rec_fromi |> n/2) used in the
line 17 of the protocol shown in Fig. 1.
Note that the only variables that cannot be replaced by the use of certificates are the
round number (r), the coordinator (c, which directly depends on r) and the current es-
timates (est_vect). Then, their values must be authenticated by certificates as explained
below.
4.2. Certificates attached to messages
Four types of messages are exchanged, namely, INIT, CURRENT, NEXT and DECIDE.
Each time a message m (INIT, CURRENT, NEXT) is received by the certification mod-
ule, m is appended to a local variable keeping the corresponding certificates (est_cert,
current_cert or next_cert, respectively). These statements are depicted inside a box in
the protocol described in Fig. 3.
Each time a process pi sends a message m, according to the type of m, an appropri-
ate certificate is associated with m by the certification module. This certificate depends
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function consensus(vi )(1) next_certi ←∅ ; est_certi ←∅ ; ri ← 0;
cobegin
(2) || upon receipt of a properly signed and formed 〈decide(pk, est_vectk), certk〉k
(3) send 〈decide(pi, est_vectk), certk〉i to Π ; return(est_vectk )
(4) || for k← 1 to n do est_vecti [k]← null endfor;
(5) send 〈init(pi, vi ),∅〉i to Π ;
(6) while |est_certi | = (n− F) do
(7) wait receipt of 〈init(pk, vk), certk〉k ;
(8) est_certi ← est_certi ∪ 〈init(pk, vk), certk〉k ; est_vecti [k]← vk
(9) end while
(10) loop % on a sequence of asynchronous rounds %
(11) c← (ri mod n)+ 1; ri ← ri + 1;
(12) if (i = c) then send 〈current(pi, ri , est_vecti ), est_certi ∪ next_certi〉i to Π endif;
% q0 → q1 for i = c %
(13) next_certi ←∅ ; current_certi ←∅ ;
(14) while (|next_certi | (n− F)) do
(15) upon receipt of a properly signed and formed 〈current(pk, ri , est_vectk), certk〉k
(16) current_certi ← current_certi ∪ 〈current(pk, ri , est_vectk), certk〉k ;
(17) if (|current_certi | = 1) then est_certi ← certk ; est_vecti ← est_vectk endif;
(18) if (|current_certi | = 1) ∧ (〈next(pi, ri), certi〉i /∈ next_certi ) ∧
(i = c) % q0 → q1 for i = c %
(19) then send 〈current(pi, ri , est_vecti ), current_certi〉i to Π endif;
(20) if (|current_certi | = (n− F)) then
(21) send 〈decide(pi, est_vecti ), est_certi〉i to Π ; return(est_vecti ) endif
(22) upon (pc ∈ (suspectedi ∨ Byzantinei ))
(23) if ((|current_certi | = 0)∧ 〈next(pi , ri), certi〉i /∈ next_certi )
(24) then send 〈next(pi, ri ), current_certi ∪ next_certi ∪ est_certi 〉i to
Π % q0 → q2 %
(25) endif
(26) upon receipt of a properly signed and formed 〈next(pk, ri), certk〉k
(27) next_certi ← next_certi ∪ 〈next(pk, ri ), certk〉k
(28) upon (change_mind) % q1 → q2 %
(29) send 〈next(pi, ri ), current_certi ∪ next_certi〉i to Π
(30) endwhile
(31) if (〈next(pi, ri ), certi 〉i /∈ next_certi ) then send 〈next(pi, ri ),next_certi〉i to Π
endif % q0/q1 → q2 %
(32) endloop
coend
Fig. 3. The Consensus module of process pi .
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on the protocol statement that issues the sending of m. This certificate will be used by
the Byzantine behaviour detection module of the receiver to check the proper sending
of m.
Certifying initial values for Vector Consensus. For each process pi , the first problem lies
in obtaining a vector of proposed values (certified vector) that verifies the Vector Validity
property (Section 3). This certified vector will then be used as the value proposed by pi to
the consensus protocol.
This certification procedure is similar to the one proposed by Doudou and Schiper in [5].
It is described in the protocol of Fig. 3 (line 4 to line 9). Each process initially broadcasts
its value vi and then waits for (n− F) values from other processes. Each time pi receives
a value, the message is added to est_certi .
Exiting from the initial while loop (lines 6–9) we say that “est_certi is well-formed with
respect to a value est_vecti” if the following conditions are satisfied:
• |est_certi | = (n− F) (otherwise process pk has either omitted to execute the receipt
of line 7 or misevaluated the condition of line 6), and
• the value est_vecti is correct with respect to the (n− F) INIT messages contained in
est_certi . Otherwise process pi either has omitted to execute the update of est_vecti
(line 8), or has corrupted its value (intuitively, this means that those (n−F) messages
“witness” that est_vecti is a correct value, because n− F  n−C).
Certifying estimate values. The initial value of est_vecti (obtained when exiting from
lines 4–9) is certified by est_certi , as explained above. This variable can then take succes-
sive values: it can be updated at most once per round (line 17) due to the delivery of the
first CURRENT message received during this round (line 15). When this occurs, the certifi-
cate est_certi is also updated. Since this message is properly formed, its certificate certk
contains a correct certificate est_certk (i.e., a certificate well-formed with respect to the
value est_vectk contained in the CURRENT message). During a round, est_certi is said to
be “well-formed with respect to est_vecti” if the value est_vecti is the value included in the
(n− F) messages contained in est_certk . Otherwise, it means that process pi has either
omitted to execute the update of est_vecti (line 17), or corrupted its value.
From round r − 1 to round r . A process progresses from round r − 1 to round r when
the predicate of line 14 is false. When a new round r starts, we say that next_certi is
well-formed with respect to r − 1 if the following two conditions are satisfied:
• |next_certi | = (n−F) and r > 1 (otherwise process pi has misevaluated the condition
of line 14).
• The value r − 1 is consistent with respect to the information in the (n − F) NEXT
messages contained in est_certi (i.e., all messages refer to round r − 1. Otherwise
process pk has corrupted the value of r at line 11).
• If r = 1, then next_certi = ∅ (otherwise either pi has corrupted r or c (line 11) or has
misevaluated the condition of line 12).
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4.3. Protocol descriptionThe text of the protocol is presented in Fig. 3. In the following, a vote means a message
CURRENT or NEXT, and a valid vote means a properly signed and formed vote.
• At the beginning of a round r , the current coordinator pc proposes its estimate
est_vectc to become the decision value by broadcasting a CURRENT vote carrying
this value (line 12). This vote is certified by est_certc ∪ next_certc. est_certc is used
to certify the value proposed by the coordinator est_vectc. I.e., est_certc must be well
formed with respect to est_vectc . next_certc is used to certify the value of the current
round r (i.e., next_certc must be well formed with respect to r − 1).
• When pi receives the first CURRENT valid vote while in state q0 (line 17). It relays a
CURRENT vote (line 19) by using the valid vote CURRENT just received as a certifi-
cate. This certificate contains est_certc ∪ next_certc used to certify r and est_vectc (as
above).
• If, while it is in the initial state q0, pi suspects the current coordinator, it broad-
casts a NEXT vote (line 24) and moves to q2. This vote is certified by est_certi ∪
current_certi ∪ next_certi . Those certificates (current_certi and next_certi ) will be
used by the Byzantine behaviour detection module of the receiver to decide whether
pi has misevaluated or not the sending condition (at line 23). Moreover, as NEXT votes
can also be sent at lines 29 and 31, est_certi is used to allow the receiver to determine
the condition that has triggered the NEXT vote it receives.
• When the predicate at line 28 becomes true, in order to avoid a deadlock, process pi
broadcasts a NEXT vote to favor the transition to the next round (line 29). This vote is
certified by current_certi ∪ next_certi . current_certi and next_certi are used to certify
the non-misevaluation of the predicate change_mind.
• When a process progresses from round r to round r + 1 it issues a NEXT vote if it did
not do it in the while loop. These NEXT votes are used to prevent other processes from
remaining blocked in round r (line 31). This vote is certified by next_certi which will
allow a receiver to check the correct evaluation of the condition at line 14 by verifying
if next_certi is well formed with respect to r .
4.4. Taking a decision
A process decides a value est_vectc at round r either when it has received (n−F) valid
CURRENT votes (lines 20–21) or when it receives a properly signed and formed DECIDE
message from another process (lines 2–3). In the first case the process authenticates its
decision by using a well-formed current_certi as a certificate (line 21), in the second case
the message (with the same certificate) is relayed to the other processes (line 3).
We say that current_certi is well formed with respect to r and est_vect if the following
conditions are satisfied:
• |current_certi | = (n−F) (otherwise process pi misevaluated the condition of line 20);
• the certificate of each message in current_certi contains a est_certc well formed with
respect to est_vect;
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• the certificate of each message in current_certi contains a next_cert well formed with
respect to r .
4.5. Summary
Thanks to the verifications made by the Signature verification module and the Byzantine
behaviour detection module, we have, for every correct process:
• Every accepted INIT(pk, vk) message has a correct field pk (signature module).
• Every accepted CURRENT(pk, r, est_vectk) message has correct fields pk (Signature
verification module), r (certificate next_certk) and est_vectk (certificate est_certk con-
tained in current_certk).
• Every accepted NEXT(pk, r) message has correct fields pk (signature module) and r
(certificate next_certk).
• Every accepted DECIDE(pk, est_vectk) message has correct fields pk (Signature veri-
fication module), and est_vectk (certificates contained in current_certk).
5. The Byzantine behaviour detection module
The Byzantine behaviour detection module of process pi is composed of a set of finite
state automata, one for each process. The module associated with pi is depicted in Fig. 4.
This module detects if a given process pk has shown a Byzantine behaviour. This detection
is carried out in two steps. (i) It is first checked if a certificate of a message is well formed
with respect to the value carried by this message. It is then (ii) checked if the type of the
message follows the program specification (i.e., if it has been sent at the right time). If one
of these steps detects something wrong, the automaton falls in the state Byz which means
Fig. 4. Finite state automaton of the pi ’s Byzantine behaviour detection module to monitor process pj .
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pk is Byzantine, furthermore, the message is discarded. Otherwise, the message is passed
to the consensus module of process pi . So, the detection of the three types of Byzantine
behaviour effects, introduced Section 3.1, is ensured:
• Message corruption is detected by the certification mechanism (the sender’s identity
has been checked by the signature module);
• Message sending omission or duplication are detected by the automaton, designed ac-
cordingly to the protocol specification (the FIFO channel communication assumption
facilitates this detection).
The automaton of pi related to pk represents the view pi has, during the current round
ri , on the behaviour of pk with respect to its automaton (made of states q0, q1 and q2,
see Sections 2 and 4) during the same round. It evaluates a condition each time a mes-
sage has arrived from pk . According to the result of this evaluation, it moves from its
current state a to another state b. The condition is composed of the following predicates.
PFa,b(type_of _messagek) returns true if the message is properly formed. The predicate
type_of _messagek is true if a message of that type has been received from pk .
Automaton states. The automaton of process pi related to a process pk is composed of
6 states. Three states are related to a single round (as the ones described in the previous
section: q0, q1, q2), one is the initial state (start), one is the final state (final) and one is the
state declaring pk is Byzantine (Byz). Note that the predicate pk ∈ Byzantinei is true if the
automata related to pk of process pi is in state Byz. It is false otherwise.
Automaton transitions.
• Transition start → q0. It occurs as soon as an INIT message is received from pk , i.e.,
initk becomes true.
• Transition start → Byz. It occurs when pi receives any other message from pk (e.g.,
CURRENT, NEXT or DECIDE) before INIT. Due to the FIFO property of channels, pi
concludes that pk is Byzantine as it omitted to execute line 5 and moves to state Byz.
• Transition q0 → q1. The Byzantine behaviour detection module of process pi receives
〈current(pk, ri , est_vectk), certk〉k from pk . We have two cases:
Case 1. pk is the coordinator (the message was sent by pk from line 12). I.e., certk =
est_certk ∪ next_certk . The predicate PF0,1(currentk) returns true if:
(1) est_certk is well-formed with respect to a value est_vectk , and
(2) next_certk is well-formed with respect to the round number ri − 1.
Case 2. pk is not the coordinator (the message was sent by pk from line 19). I.e.,
certk = current_certk . According to the protocol, the certificate must include the mes-
sage 〈current(pc, est_vectc, ri ), cert〉c in order to be properly formed (line 16), then,
once extracted this message from the certificate, all tests of case 1 can be executed on
est_certc ∪ next_certc .
• Transition q0 → q2. Upon the arrival of a 〈next(pk, ri ), certk〉k at the Byzantine be-
haviour detection module, we have two cases:
Case 1. If certk does not contain any INIT message, it was sent by pk from line 31
where certk = next_certk . In such a case PF0,2(next) is true if certk is well formed
with respect to ri − 1. Otherwise there was a misevaluation of the condition at line 14.
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Case 2. If certk contains at least one INIT message, the NEXT message was sent by
pk from line 24 with certk = current_certk ∪ next_certk ∪ est_certk . This sending is
guarded by the conditions at line 23. PF0,2(next) is true, if by using the information
contained in certk , est_certk is well-formed with respect to a value est_vectk and the
conditions at line 23 (i.e., ((|current_certk| = 0)∧ 〈next(pk, ri ), cert〉k /∈ next_certk))
can be evaluated to true.
Remark. Note that even though PF0,2(next) is true, the process pk could be Byzantine as
it could misevaluate the predicate pc ∈ (suspectedi ∨ Byzantinei ) used at line 22 and no
information about that fault can be found in the certificate. One solution to this problem is
to say that, as at most F processes are Byzantine, then even though all of them misevaluate
that predicate and generate false NEXT messages, this does not prevent other processes to
get a decision due to conditions of line 14.
• Transition q0 → Byz. Upon the arrival of a message, pi declares pk Byzantine, if one
of the following four conditions is true: (i) PF0,1(current) is false (in the case of the
receipt of a CURRENT message); or (ii) PF0,2(next) is false (in the case of the receipt
of a NEXT message); or (iii) the message is of type DECIDE; or (iv) the message is of
type INIT. In the case (iii), as channels are FIFO, a NEXT or DECIDE message has been
omitted by pk . In the case (iv) process pk executed twice the statement at line 5.
• Transition q1 → q2. Upon the arrival of a 〈next(pk, ri ), cert〉k from pk at the Byzantine
behaviour detection module, it executes the following tests on the certificate certk . The
NEXT message was sent by pk from line 24 with certk = current_certk ∪ next_certk ∪
est_certk . That sending is guarded by the condition at line 23.
PF1,2(next) is true if, using the information contained in certk , the predicate
change_mind can be evaluated to true. As above remark the fact that PF1,2(next)
is true does not imply that the sender process is correct, as the condition at line 28
includes the predicate pc ∈ (suspectedi ∨ Byzantinei ) that can be misevaluated by pk
without being detected.
• Transition q1 → final and transition q2 → final. These transitions occur upon the ar-
rival of a message 〈decide(pk, est_vectk), cert〉k at the Byzantine behaviour detection
module. PF1,2(decide) (respectively PF1,final(decide)) is true if certk is well formed
with respect to est_vectk and ri .
• Transition q1 → Byz. Upon the receipt of a message, pi declares pk Byzantine, if one
of the following three conditions is true: (i) PF1,2(nextk) is false (in the case of the
receipt of a NEXT message); or (ii) PF1,final(decidek) is false (in the case of the receipt
of a DECIDE message); or (iii) the message is of type CURRENT. In the latter case, as
channels are FIFO, a NEXT or DECIDE message should be received by pi from pk , then
pk had a Byzantine behaviour.
• Transition q2 → Byz. Upon the receipt of a message, pi declares pk Byzantine, if one
of the following three conditions is true: (i) PF2,final(decidek) is false (in the case of
the receipt of a DECIDE message); or (ii) the message is of type CURRENT; or (iv) the
message is of type NEXT. In the latter two cases, as channels are FIFO only a DECIDE
message should be received by pi from pk , if a then message of type CURRENT or
NEXT is received from pk , it had a Byzantine behaviour.
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• Transition Byz → Byz. Once pk is declared Byzantine it remains in the state Byz what-
ever type of message is received.
• Transition q2 → q0 (denoted by a dotted line). A process pk in p2 either decides a
value, and then moves to final or moves to q0 (and then to the successive round) in
a finite time. The fact that pk moved to q0 can be detected if the successive message
received by the process from pk is either a NEXT or a CURRENT message related to
round r + 1.
6. Correctness proof
This section proves that the previous protocol satisfies the Termination, Vector Validity
and Agreement properties. This proof assumes that:
• H1: There are at most F processes that do not behave correctly, with F min(n−12 ,
C).
• H2: The underlying muteness failure detector belongs to the class✸M, i.e., it satisfies:
– H2.1: Strong Completeness (eventually, every mute process is permanently sus-
pected by every correct process). And,
– H2.2: Eventual Weak Accuracy (eventually, some correct process is never suspected
by any correct process).
• H3: The underlying Byzantine behaviour detector is reliable (if pi is correct and if
pj ∈ Byzantinei then pj has experienced at least one Byzantine behaviour).
• H4: Communication channels are FIFO.
6.1. Vector Validity
Lemma 6.1. Eventually, every correct process builds a vector est_vecti such that
est_vecti [i] = vi and
∀k = i: est_vecti[k] = vk or est_vecti[k] = null.
Proof. From assumptions H1 and H4, the while loop eventually terminates (line 9) and
the values contained in est_vecti are either null (line 4) or set at line 8. ✷
Lemma 6.2. During any round r , for any process pi , we have: |current_certi | > 0 ⇒
est_vecti = est_vectc, where pc is the current coordinator. In particular, est_vecti [i] = vi
or est_vecti[i] = null.
Proof. case i = c. est_vectc is updated with the value est_vectc at most once in the current
round, at line 17.
case i = c. est_vecti is updated at most once per round, at line 17, when pi receives for the
first time a valid vote CURRENT. Let pk be the sender of this vote.
• If k = c then est_vecti ← est_vectc = est_vectc
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• If k = c let us examine the sequence of votes CURRENT leading to the update of line
17:
– Every process pj (j = c) sending a vote CURRENT (at line 19) has received a valid
vote 〈current(−, vect,−),−〉 and has performed line 17: est_vectj ← vect
– Only pc can initiate such a sequence of CURRENT messages.
From this follows that est_vecti = est_vectk = · · · = est_vectj = · · · = est_vectc. Thus,
in particular, est_vecti[i] = est_vectc[i] and this value is either vi or null, from Lem-
ma 6.1. ✷
Lemma 6.3. No process can build two different initial certified vectors.
Proof. During the initial phase (lines 6–9) a process pi can receive at most one INIT mes-
sage from each process pk . In fact, INIT messages are signed and the Byzantine behaviour
detection module filters out duplicate messages. Suppose that pi builds two different initial
certified vectors est_vecti and est_vect′i (with est_vecti = est_vect′i ). In that case, pi has
two certificates est_certi and est_cert′i well-formed respectively with respect to est_vecti
and est_vect′i . In particular, |est_certi | = |est_cert′i | = (n− F). Each of these certificates
contains (n− F) identities of processes, namely the senders of the (n− F) signed INIT
messages forming these certificates. Let X (respectively X′) denote the set of process iden-
tities belonging to certi (respectively cert ′i ). By assumption, |X| = |X′| = (n−F). On the
other hand, |X∩X′| = |X|+ |X′|− |X∪X′|, and thus |X∩X′| 2(n−F)−n= n−2F .
From assumption H1, we get n− 2F  1, which means X∩X′ = ∅. Thus, pi has received
two INIT messages from a same sender. A contradiction. ✷
Lemma 6.4. A correct process sending a message DECIDE (whose initial sending has been
initiated at round r , line 21) decides est_vectc (where pc is the coordinator of round r).
Proof. A process decides at line 3 or at line 21.
• If pi decides at line 21, then |current_certi | > 0 and thus, from Lemma 6.2, pi de-
cides est_vecti = est_vectc. Before deciding, it sends a message DECIDE with the value
est_vectc to all other processes.
• If pi decides at line 3, it decides the value contained in the properly signed and formed
message DECIDE. This message contains est_vectc. ✷
Theorem 6.5. If a correct process decides, it is on a vector v of size n, satisfying Vector
Validity with at least α = n− 2F  1 entries from correct processes.
Proof. Every process builds a vector (Lemma 6.1), containing (n−F) values from differ-
ent processes (lines 6–9) and F null values (line 4). If a process decides at round r , then it
decides est_vectc (Lemma 6.4). If pc has sent a CURRENT vote, est_certc is well-formed
with respect to est_vectc. In particular, est_vectc is correct with respect to the (n−F) INIT
messages contained in cert_initc. So, est_vectc contains (n− F) initial values of different
processes. Moreover, from Lemma 6.1, est_vectc[i] = vi or est_vectc[i] = null.
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Let nb_correctc (respectively nb_faultyc) denote the number of non-null entries of
est_vectc that are initial values from correct (respectively non correct) processes. We have
nb_correctc + nb_faultyc = (n− F). But nb_faultyc  F and thus nb_correctc  n− 2F .
From assumption H1, we have n− 2F  n− 2n−12  1. ✷
6.2. Termination
Lemma 6.6. If a correct process decides, then eventually every correct process will decide.
Proof. Let pi deciding at line 3 or at line 21. In both cases, pi sends a properly signed
and formed message DECIDE to every other process. From assumption H4, every cor-
rect process that did not yet decide eventually receive this message (line 2) and decides
(line 3). ✷
Lemma 6.7. If no process decides during any round r ′  r , then all correct processes start
round r + 1.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose no process has decided in any round r ′  r ,
where r is the smallest round number in which some correct process blocks forever in
the while loop (lines 14–32). Let us note that no correct process has received a DECIDE
message (otherwise, it would execute lines 2–3 and decide). In the following proof, we
use the following notations, recalling the “hidden” states q0, q1, q2 of the processes (cf.
Section 4.1):
state q0 ≡
(|current_certi | = 0
)∧ 〈next(pi, ri ), cert
〉
i
/∈ next_certi ,
state q1 ≡
(|current_certi | 1
)∧ 〈next(pi, ri ), cert
〉
i
/∈ next_certi ,
state q2 ≡
〈
next(pi, ri ), cert
〉
i
∈ next_certi .
(1) Note first that any process starting round r is in state q0 before entering the while loop
(lines 11 and 13 ). Firstly, it is shown that a correct process pi cannot remain in state
q0 during round r . This follows from:
(i) Either pi suspects pc and moves to q2 (lines 22–25). This is due either to the
underlying muteness failure detection module (possibly mistaken), or because pc
is detected as Byzantine by the underlying Byzantine behaviour detection module.
(ii) Or pi never suspects pc . Due to assumption H2.1 (Strong Completeness), this
means that pc is not quiet for pi : eventually it broadcasts a CURRENT vote. Due
to assumption H4, pi receives at least one CURRENT valid vote (from pc or from
another process) and moves to q1 (line 15).
(2) A correct process cannot remain in state q1. By contradiction: suppose that a correct
process pi remains in state q1. From the previous point, any correct process either
sends a CURRENT vote and moves to q1 (case ii), or sends a NEXT vote and moves to
q2 (case i). It follows from assumption H1 that any correct process will receive at least
(n−F) valid votes and thus eventually |REC_FROMi | (n−F). Thus pi eventually
satisfies change_mind. Hence, the condition stated at line 28 eventually becomes true:
pi issues a NEXT vote and moves to q2.
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(3) It follows from the two previous points that all correct processes move to q2 and send a
NEXT vote. Consequently, any correct process pi receives at least (n−F) NEXT valid
votes, and thus proceeds to round r + 1. A contradiction. ✷
Lemma 6.8. During a round r , if no process suspects the coordinator (or, equivalently,
no process moves from state q0 directly to state q2) within the while loop, then no process
sends a NEXT vote (or equivalently, no process moves to q2).
Proof. From the lemma assumption, no process executes lines 22–25 (going to state q2).
Suppose that, during round r , a process sends a NEXT vote. So, there exists a process
that has sent a NEXT vote before receiving a NEXT valid vote. Such a process pi executes
line 29 or line 31.
• pi executes line 29. This is possible only because change_mind has become true
(line 28), i.e., pi has received a (CURRENT or NEXT) valid vote from at least (n− F)
processes. If one of these votes is a NEXT, this contradicts the fact that pi has sent
a NEXT vote before receiving a NEXT valid vote. So, all these valid votes are CUR-
RENT. Thus, pi has decided at line 21 when it received the last valid vote making true
the condition |current_certi | = (n − F). Consequently, as pi has executed a return
statement it will never execute line 29. Contradiction.
• pi executes line 31. To send a NEXT vote at line 31, pi has terminated its while loop.
So, it has |next_certi | > F . It follows that pi has received NEXT valid votes before
executing line 31. Contradiction. ✷
Theorem 6.9. Every correct process eventually decides some value.
Proof. Let us consider the two following cases.
(1) A correct process pj decides (at line 21). From Lemma 6.6, every correct process
eventually decides.
(2) No process decides. We will show there is a contradiction. There is a time t after which
(due to assumption H2.2, Eventual Weak Accuracy) there is a correct process that is
no longer suspected (let pj be this process). Let r be the first round that occurs after t
and which is coordinated by pj (due to Lemma 6.7, such a round does exist since no
process decides).
• The coordinator pj sends a CURRENT vote to all processes.
• As, by assumption, the current coordinator pj is not suspected, no process pi ex-
ecutes lines 22–25. Consequently, no process moves directly from q0 to q2 within
the while loop.
• From Lemma 6.8, we conclude that no process sends a NEXT vote, i.e., no process
moves to q2.
• A process entering the loop while (line 14) cannot exit this loop, because
|next_certi | remains equal to 0.
• From assumptions H1 and H4, each correct process pi will receive at least
(n − F) CURRENT valid votes. As no process sends a NEXT vote, it follows that
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any correct process pi will necessarily decide at line 21. This contradicts the as-
sumption that no process decides. ✷
6.3. Agreement
Lemma 6.10. If a process decides v and broadcasts a properly signed and formed DECIDE
message at line 21 of round r , then all correct processes pj that start round r + 1 do so
with est_vectj = v.
Proof.
(1) As pi broadcasts a message DECIDE labeled with the round number r , some process
pk (possibly pi ) has processed the line 21 during round r and, consequently,
|current_certk| = (n − F) (R1). Moreover, from Lemma 6.4, the decision value v
is equal to est_vectc .
(2) Let us consider the three following sets of processes (related to round r):
Xr1 = {processes that moved from q0 to q1 and did not move to q2},
Xr2 = {processes that moved from q0 directly to q2},
Xr3 = {processes that moved from q0 to q1 and then to q2}.
Note that these sets are disjoint. They include processes that have possibly behaved
incorrectly after moving from q0 to another state. Moreover, we have |Xr1| + |Xr2| +|Xr3| n (R2).
(3) Let sent_to_pk be the number of processes that sent a CURRENT vote to pk . As the
number of CURRENT votes sent to a pk is greater than or equal to the number of
CURRENT valid votes received by pk , we have sent_to_pk |current_certk| (R3).
(4) All processes belonging to Xr3 have sent a CURRENT vote to pk at line 19 (when they
moved from q0 to q1). Moreover, all processes belonging to Xr1 and which executed all
of line 19 have sent a CURRENT vote to pk . Some processes belonging to Xr1 and which
have partially executed line 19 have also sent a CURRENT vote to pk . Finally, processes
in Xr2 have not sent a CURRENT vote. It follows that sent_to_pk |Xr1| + |Xr3| (R4).
(5) From (R1) and (R3), we conclude sent_to_pk (n− F) (R5).
(6) From (R5) and (R4), we conclude |Xr1| + |Xr3| (n− F) (R6).
(7) From (R6) and (R2), we conclude |Xr2| F (R7).
The proof is now by contradiction. Suppose that pi decides (and consequently (R7)
holds), and that there is a process pj which enters round r + 1 with est_vectj = v (i.e.,
est_vectj = est_vectc). Let us consider the value |current_certj | just before pj leaves
round r . There are two cases.
(1) |current_certj |> 0. From Lemma 6.2, we have est_vectj = est_vectc, a contradiction.
(2) |current_certj | = 0. In this case, since, according to the lemma assumption, pj pro-
ceeds to the next round, we have |next_certj |> F (R8), at the end of round r . Com-
bining (R7) and (R8), we get |next_certj |> |Xr2| (R9).
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Since NEXT votes are only sent by processes belonging to Xr ∪Xr , and as (by definition)2 3
Xr2 ∩Xr3 = ∅, from (R9) we conclude that pj received at least one NEXT valid vote from a
process p ∈Xr3. As p belongs to Xr3:
•  = c and p first passed through state q1. So, it processed lines 17–19, from which
we conclude |current_cert|> 0 and, from Lemma 6.2, est_vect = est_vectc . In par-
ticular, p has sent a CURRENT vote to pj .
• p then moved from q1 to q2. So, it necessarily sent the NEXT vote (received by pj ) at
line 29.
From H4, pj has received from p the 〈current(p, r, est_vect), current_cert〉 valid
vote first (line 15), then the 〈next(p, r), current_cert ∪ next_cert〉 (line 26). Upon the
receipt of the CURRENT valid vote, the condition of line 17 holds and pj has updated
est_vectj to est_vect_= est_vect_c. Upon the receipt of the NEXT valid vote, no update
of est_vectj occurred. So, just before pj leaves round r , est_vectj = est_vectc. A contra-
diction. ✷
Theorem 6.11. No two correct processes decide different values.
Proof. Let pi and pj two correct processes that decide. There are two cases:
(1) Both pi and pj decide at the same round r (both execute the line 21 during the round
r). Let est_vectc denote the certified initial vector built by the coordinator pc of round
r (Lemma 6.1). From Lemma 6.4, a process that decides at round r decides the value
est_vectc . From Lemma 6.3, the coordinator cannot build two different certified initial
vectors. So, pi and pj decide the same value est_vectc .
(2) pi decides v at round r and pj decides at round r ′ > r . From Lemma 6.10, every cor-
rect process pk that starts round r + 1 does so with est_vectk = v. In other words, the
only possible estimate value for a correct process participating in any round r ′  r+1,
is now v = est_vectc. So, whatever the coordinator of round r ′, due to Lemma 6.4, the
value decided by pj will be v = est_vectc . ✷
7. Conclusion
The paper has presented a protocol that solves the (vector) consensus problem in a
Byzantine system. The proposed protocol is resilient to F faulty processes, F min((n−
1)/2,C) (where C is the maximum number of faulty processes the underlying certifica-
tion mechanism can tolerate). As it ensures the Vector Validity property, it can be used as
a building block to solve other agreement problems, such as Atomic Broadcast [5]. The
paper has also presented an implementation of the Byzantine behaviour detection module.
This implementation is based on a set of finite state automata. An additional interest of the
proposed protocol lies in its systematic use of certificates associated with messages. This
facilitates the implementation of the Byzantine behaviour detection module. Moreover, re-
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ducing the number of local variables, also reduces their incorrect management by faulty
processes.
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